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manuals:start [16. 09. 2016 00:07] – [Key exchange] Juremanuals:start [17. 08. 2023 14:12] (Trenutna) – ustvarjena Jurij
Vrstica 1: Vrstica 1:
 +# Navodila
  
-Rahlo paranoične navodile za utrditev SSH strežnika/klienta. +Tukaj se nahajajo razna uporabniška navodila za uporabe storitev, programov in kosov tehnike na radiu.
- +
-Vir: [[https://stribika.github.io/2015/01/04/secure-secure-shell.html]] +
- +
- +
- +
- +
- +
- +
-Alice           Bob +
---------------------------- +
-Sa = random +
-Pa = g^Sa   --> Pa +
-                Sb = random +
-Pb          <-- Pb = g^Sb +
-s = Pb^Sa       s = Pa^Sb +
-k = KDF(s)      k = KDF(s) +
- +
-ECDH works with elliptic curves over finite fields. Its security is based on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. +
- +
-Alice           Bob +
---------------------------- +
-Sa = random +
-Pa = Sa * G --> Pa +
-                Sb = random +
-Pb          <-- Pb = Sb * G +
-s = Sa * Pb     s = Sb * Pa +
-k = KDF(s)      k = KDF(s) +
- +
-OpenSSH supports 8 key exchange protocols: +
- +
-    curve25519-sha256: ECDH over Curve25519 with SHA2 +
-    diffie-hellman-group1-sha1: 1024 bit DH with SHA1 +
-    diffie-hellman-group14-sha1: 2048 bit DH with SHA1 +
-    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1: Custom DH with SHA1 +
-    diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256: Custom DH with SHA2 +
-    ecdh-sha2-nistp256: ECDH over NIST P-256 with SHA2 +
-    ecdh-sha2-nistp384: ECDH over NIST P-384 with SHA2 +
-    ecdh-sha2-nistp521: ECDH over NIST P-521 with SHA2 +
- +
-We have to look at 3 things here: +
- +
-    ECDH curve choice: This eliminates 6-8 because NIST curves suck. They leak secrets through timing side channels and off-curve inputs. Also, NIST is considered harmful and cannot be trusted. +
-    Bit size of the DH modulus: This eliminates 2 because the NSA has supercomputers and possibly unknown attacks. 1024 bits simply don’t offer sufficient security margin. +
-    Security of the hash function: This eliminates 2-4 because SHA1 is broken. We don’t have to wait for a second preimage attack that takes 10 minutes on a cellphone to disable it right now. +
- +
-We are left with 1 and 5. 1 is better and it’s perfectly OK to only support that but for interoperability (with Eclipse, WinSCP), 5 can be included. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/sshd_config snippet: +
- +
-KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/ssh_config snippet: +
- +
-# Github needs diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 some of the time but not always. +
-#Host github.com +
-#    KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 +
-     +
-Host * +
-    KexAlgorithms curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 +
- +
-If you chose to enable 5, open /etc/ssh/moduli if exists, and delete lines where the 5th column is less than 2000. +
- +
-awk '$5 > 2000' /etc/ssh/moduli > "${HOME}/moduli" +
-wc -l "${HOME}/moduli" # make sure there is something left +
-mv "${HOME}/moduli" /etc/ssh/moduli +
- +
-If it does not exist, create it: +
- +
-ssh-keygen -G /etc/ssh/moduli.all -b 4096 +
-ssh-keygen -T /etc/ssh/moduli.safe -f /etc/ssh/moduli.all +
-mv /etc/ssh/moduli.safe /etc/ssh/moduli +
-rm /etc/ssh/moduli.all +
- +
-This will take a while so continue while it’s running. +
-Authentication +
- +
-The key exchange ensures that the server and the client shares a secret no one else knows. We also have to make sure that they share this secret with each other and not an NSA analyst. +
-Server authentication +
- +
-The server proves its identity to the client by signing the key resulting from the key exchange. There are 4 public key algorithms for authentication: +
- +
-    DSA with SHA1 +
-    ECDSA with SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512 depending on key size +
-    Ed25519 with SHA512 +
-    RSA with SHA1 +
- +
-DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits so let’s disable that. Number 2 here involves NIST suckage and should be disabled as well. Another important disadvantage of DSA and ECDSA is that it uses randomness for each signature. If the random numbers are not the best quality, then it is possible to recover the secret key. Fortunately, RSA using SHA1 is not a problem here because the value being signed is actually a SHA2 hash. The hash function SHA1(SHA2(x)) is just as secure as SHA2 (it has less bits of course but no better attacks). +
- +
-Protocol 2 +
-HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key +
-HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key +
- +
-The first time you connect to your server, you will be asked to accept the new fingerprint. +
- +
-This will also disable the horribly broken v1 protocol that you should not have enabled in the first place. We should remove the unused keys and only generate a large RSA key and an Ed25519 key. Your init scripts may recreate the unused keys. If you don’t want that, remove any ssh-keygen commands from the init script. +
- +
-cd /etc/ssh +
-rm ssh_host_*key* +
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f ssh_host_ed25519_key < /dev/null +
-ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -f ssh_host_rsa_key < /dev/null +
- +
-Client authentication +
- +
-The client must prove its identity to the server as well. There are various methods to do that. +
- +
-The simplest is password authentication. This should be disabled immediately after setting up a more secure method because it allows compromised servers to steal passwords. Password authentication is also more vulnerable to online bruteforce attacks. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/sshd_config snippet: +
- +
-PasswordAuthentication no +
-ChallengeResponseAuthentication no +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/ssh_config snippet: +
- +
-Host * +
-    PasswordAuthentication no +
-    ChallengeResponseAuthentication no +
- +
-The most common and secure method is public key authentication, basically the same process as the server authentication. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/sshd_config snippet: +
- +
-PubkeyAuthentication yes +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/ssh_config snippet: +
- +
-Host * +
-    PubkeyAuthentication yes +
-    HostKeyAlgorithms ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa +
- +
-Generate client keys using the following commands: +
- +
-ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -o -a 100 +
-ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 4096 -o -a 100 +
- +
-You can deploy your new client public keys using ssh-copy-id. +
- +
-It is also possible to use OTP authentication to reduce the consequences of lost passwords. Google Authenticator is a nice implementation of TOTP, or Timebased One Time Password. You can also use a printed list of one time passwords or any other PAM module, really, if you enable ChallengeResponseAuthentication. +
-User Authentication +
- +
-Even with Public Key authentication, you should only allow incoming connections from expected users. The AllowUsers setting in sshd_config lets you specify users who are allowed to connect, but this can get complicated with a large number of ssh users. Additionally, when deleting a user from the system, the username is not removed from sshd_config, which adds to maintenance requirements. The solution is to use the AllowGroups setting instead, and add users to an ssh-user group. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/sshd_config snippet: +
- +
-AllowGroups ssh-user +
- +
-Create the ssh-user group with sudo groupadd ssh-user, then add each ssh user to the group with sudo usermod -a -G ssh-user <username>. +
-Symmetric ciphers +
- +
-Symmetric ciphers are used to encrypt the data after the initial key exchange and authentication is complete. +
- +
-Here we have quite a few algorithms: +
- +
-    3des-cbc +
-    aes128-cbc +
-    aes192-cbc +
-    aes256-cbc +
-    aes128-ctr +
-    aes192-ctr +
-    aes256-ctr +
-    aes128-gcm@openssh.com +
-    aes256-gcm@openssh.com +
-    arcfour +
-    arcfour128 +
-    arcfour256 +
-    blowfish-cbc +
-    cast128-cbc +
-    chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +
- +
-We have to consider the following: +
- +
-    Security of the cipher algorithm: This eliminates 1 and 10-12 - both DES and RC4 are broken. Again, no need to wait for them to become even weaker, disable them now. +
-    Key size: At least 128 bits, the more the better. +
-    Block size: Does not apply to stream ciphers. At least 128 bits. This eliminates 13 and 14 because those have a 64 bit block size. +
-    Cipher mode: The recommended approach here is to prefer AE modes and optionally allow CTR for compatibility. CTR with Encrypt-then-MAC is provably secure. +
- +
-Chacha20-poly1305 is preferred over AES-GCM because the SSH protocol does not encrypt message sizes when GCM (or EtM) is in use. This allows some traffic analysis even without decrypting the data. We will deal with that soon. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/sshd_config snippet: +
- +
-Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/ssh_config snippet: +
- +
-Host * +
-    Ciphers chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com,aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes128-ctr +
- +
-Message authentication codes +
- +
-Encryption provides confidentiality, message authentication code provides integrity. We need both. If an AE cipher mode is selected, then extra MACs are not used, the integrity is already given. If CTR is selected, then we need a MAC to calculate and attach a tag to every message. +
- +
-There are multiple ways to combine ciphers and MACs - not all of these are useful. The 3 most common: +
- +
-    Encrypt-then-MAC: encrypt the message, then attach the MAC of the ciphertext. +
-    MAC-then-encrypt: attach the MAC of the plaintext, then encrypt everything. +
-    Encrypt-and-MAC: encrypt the message, then attach the MAC of the plaintext. +
- +
-Only Encrypt-then-MAC should be used, period. Using MAC-then-encrypt have lead to many attacks on TLS while Encrypt-and-MAC have lead to not quite that many attacks on SSH. The reason for this is that the more you fiddle with an attacker provided message, the more chance the attacker has to gain information through side channels. In case of Encrypt-then-MAC, the MAC is verified and if incorrect, discarded. Boom, one step, no timing channels. In case of MAC-then-encrypt, first the attacker provided message has to be decrypted and only then can you verify it. Decryption failure (due to invalid CBC padding for example) may take less time than verification failure. Encrypt-and-MAC also has to be decrypted first, leading to the same kind of potential side channels. It’s even worse because no one said that a MAC’s output can’t leak what its input was. SSH by default, uses this method. +
- +
-Here are the available MAC choices: +
- +
-    hmac-md5 +
-    hmac-md5-96 +
-    hmac-ripemd160 +
-    hmac-sha1 +
-    hmac-sha1-96 +
-    hmac-sha2-256 +
-    hmac-sha2-512 +
-    umac-64 +
-    umac-128 +
-    hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com +
-    hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com +
-    hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com +
-    hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com +
-    hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com +
-    hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com +
-    hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com +
-    umac-64-etm@openssh.com +
-    umac-128-etm@openssh.com +
- +
-The selection considerations: +
- +
-    Security of the hash algorithm: No MD5 and SHA1. Yes, I know that HMAC-SHA1 does not need collision resistance but why wait? Disable weak crypto today. +
-    Encrypt-then-MAC: I am not aware of a security proof for CTR-and-HMAC but I also don’t think CTR decryption can fail. Since there are no downgrade attacks, you can add them to the end of the list. You can also do this on a host by host basis so you know which ones are less safe. +
-    Tag size: At least 128 bits. This eliminates umac-64-etm. +
-    Key size: At least 128 bits. This doesn’t eliminate anything at this point. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/sshd_config snippet: +
- +
-MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160,umac-128@openssh.com +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/ssh_config snippet: +
- +
-Host * +
-    MACs hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha2-256,hmac-ripemd160,umac-128@openssh.com +
- +
-Preventing key theft +
- +
-Even with forward secrecy the secret keys must be kept secret. The NSA has a database of stolen keys - you do not want your key there. +
-System hardening +
- +
-OpenSSH has some undocumented, and rarely used features. UseRoaming is one such feature with a known vulnerability. +
- +
-Recommended /etc/ssh/ssh_config snippet: +
- +
-Host * +
-   UseRoaming no +
- +
-This post is not intended to be a comprehensive system security guide. Very briefly: +
- +
-    Don’t install what you don’t need: Every single line of code has a chance of containing a bug. Some of these bugs are security holes. Fewer lines, fewer holes. +
-    Use free software: As in speech. You want to use code that’s actually reviewed or that you can review yourself. There is no way to achieve that without source code. Someone may have reviewed proprietary crap but who knows. +
-    Keep your software up to date: New versions often fix critical security holes. +
-    Exploit mitigation: Sad but true - there will always be security holes in your software. There are things you can do to prevent their exploitation, such as GCC’s -fstack-protector. One of the best security projects out there is Grsecurity. Use it or use OpenBSD. +
- +
- +
  
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  • manuals/start.1473977256.txt.gz
  • Zadnja sprememba: 16. 09. 2016 00:07
  • uporabnika Jure